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Will the construction of a nuclear power plant in Belarus 
exacerbate the country’s energy dependence on Russia? 
Kamil Kłysiński, Marek Menkiszak
During Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev’s working visit to Minsk on 18 July, 
Russia and Belarus signed a general contract for the construction of a nuclear 
power plant in Belarus. The signature brought to an end the complex negotia-
tions which had been underway since January 2009 involving the leadership 
in Minsk, the Russian government and Atomstroyexport, the Russian compa-
ny that will be the main contractor of the investment. However, the power 
plant’s future ownership structure, management arrangements and terms and 
conditions of profit sharing remain unclear. The Belarusian leadership hopes 
that with the launch of the nuclear power plant, it will be able to reduce gas 
imports from Russia, gas being the main resource used in producing heat and 
electricity in Belarus. This should in turn reduce the costs of energy genera-
tion. In addition, Minsk expects that the new investment will allow it to export 
electricity surpluses to the European Union, including Poland. Agreements 
concerning the power plant have been concluded over the last year or so 
and, according to these, Russia has acquired partial control of the Belarusian 
electricity grid, especially with regard to the transmission of energy to foreign 
markets. Russia is also the sole creditor and contractor for the investment, 
and the sole future provider of nuclear fuel. Therefore, implementation of the 
project will exacerbate Minsk’s already significant dependence on Moscow 
in energy and political terms. 
History of the project
In 2006 the Belarusian government took the initial decision to build a nuclear power plant 
with a capacity of over 2000 MW. In the years 2007–2008, bodies in charge of the im-
plementation of the project were designated, and international nuclear companies were in-
vited to co-operate. At that point, Atomstroyexport (Russia), AREVA (Germany/France) and 
Toshiba-Westinghouse (Japan/USA) expressed interest in building the plant. Talks were also 
opened with China’s CGNPG. In late 2008, Minsk announced that of the three prospecti-
ve locations under consideration, the site in Astravyets in the Hrodna Province had been 
selected (it is located 23 km from the Lithuanian border, 55 km from Vilnius, approx. 
90 km from Lithuania’s planned nuclear power plant in Visaginas and over 100 km from the 
Polish border). The decision triggered protests by the Lithuanian government, the Belarusian 
opposition and independent environmental organisations which argued that the choice of 
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location had not been sufficiently justified. Nevertheless, the Belarusian leadership upheld 
the decision and, in early 2009, designated Russia’s Atomstroyexport as the main contractor 
for the investment (contrary to earlier announcements, no open competition was held). 
After lengthy and tense negotiations, on 15 March 2011 Russia and Belarus finally signed an 
intergovernmental agreement on co-operation on the construction in Belarus of a two-unit 
nuclear power plant with a total capacity of 2400 MW. That agreement led to the creation, in 
June 2011, of Energoconnect, a Russian-Belarusian joint venture tasked with organising and 
controlling the export of electricity produced in Belarus (including electricity from the plan-
ned nuclear power plant) and, possibly, the re-export of Russian-generated electricity. The 
founders of the joint venture, i.e. the Russian energy company Inter RAO UES and Belarus’s 
state-owned Belenergo acquired equal, fi-
fty per cent stakes in the new company. 
On 11 October 2011, a framework contract 
for the construction of the plant was conc-
luded. On 28 November this was followed 
by an intergovernmental credit agreement 
on the financing of the investment from 
a Russian credit line of up to US$ 10 bil-
lion. At the same time, a new provision was 
added to the agreement of 25 November 2011 on the sale of a fifty per cent stake in the 
Belarusian gas pipeline network to Russia’s Gazprom, concerning the export of electricity 
produced from Russian gas. It was agreed that joint Russian-Belarusian control of electricity 
exports to countries outside the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan would be 
established as of 1 January 2015. According to preliminary reports (the exact content of the 
provision is not known), co-operation in this area will be regulated “according to each party’s 
respective contribution”. Meanwhile, first serious preparatory works on the Astravyets site 
commenced in June, including excavations for the first nuclear unit (nine months behind the 
original schedule). The construction of office space, workers hotels, storage facilities, access 
roads etc., is underway. 
The general contract was signed on 18 July, after being postponed several times since the 
spring of last year, ending the tedious efforts from both parties to reach agreement and this 
has opened the way for the project to be implemented.
Terms of the investment
According to the current schedule (the delays in negotiations have forced the parties to 
change the timeframe of the project) the first unit with a capacity of 1200 MW will be com-
missioned in November 2018, and the second, which has the same capacity – in July 2020. 
The Russian contractor, Atomstroyexport, has pledged to build a turnkey plant in compliance 
with the standards in force in Russia, but also taking into consideration the guidelines of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Union. So far, however, no in-
formation is available on the Belarusian plant’s future ownership structure, its management 
arrangements or the terms of profit sharing.
The cost of the investment has been estimated based on rates applicable to the construction 
of similar plants in Russia (in particular, the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant in the Kaliningrad 
Oblast). Under the agreement concluded back in November 2011, 90% of the cost will be 
covered from the Russian credit line. Funds will be disbursed as work progresses. The re-
payment will start six months after the plant is commissioned (but no later than April 2021) 
and will consist in 30 equal, six-monthly instalments. This means that the loan is granted 
for 25 years with a ten-year moratorium on repayment, at an average interest rate of 3.92% 
The general contract for the con-
struction of a power station brings 
an end to many years of exhausting 
talks over the implementation of 
the project to build the first nuclear 
power plant in the history of Belarus.
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(of which half is fixed interest rate, and the other half a variable interest rate adjusted for 
changes in the cost of loans to Russia on international financial markets). Belarus has agre-
ed to cover the remaining 10% of construction costs (i.e. US$ 1 billion) from its own funds. 
However, because it will have to repay approx. US$ 6 billion of external public debt between 
2013 and 2014, the Belarusian government has decided not to use up its currency rese-
rves (currently worth approx. US$ 8 billion) and has applied to Russia’s Vnesheconombank 
(the same bank that will handle the Russian credit line) for a US$ 500 million loan. The loan 
will cover the Belarusian contribution to construction costs over the next five years, which is 
estimated at US$ 100–140 million annually on average. 
The interests of Belarus
The 2007 Energy Security Concept of Belarus and the Strategy for the Development of 
the EnergyPotential of the Republic of Belarus to 2020 adopted in 2010, both identify as one 
of the strategic objectives a reduction of the share of gas in the production of heat and electricity 
from the current level of approx. 95% to 60–55% in 2020. The launch of a nuclear power plant 
in Belarus is to play a key role in the implementation of this plan. According to calculations made 
by the Belarusian Ministry of Energy, it will allow a reduction in gas imports from Russia by 
approx. 5 billion m3 a year (Belarus currently 
imports a total of approx. 22 billion m3 of 
gas a year). This, in turn, will drive down the 
cost of energy generation and reduce green-
house gas emissions by 7–10 million tons 
a year. It has also been pointed out that 
the nuclear energy sector is much less su-
sceptible to fuel price fluctuations than gas- 
-powered energy generation and, consequ-
ently, the nuclear power plant will enhance the stability of tariffs for consumers. The launch 
of a new power plant with a capacity of 2400 MW will satisfy Belarus’s growing electricity 
needs which, according to the long-term forecast of the demand for energy to 2020, will require 
a maximum of up to 650 MW of additional capacity (the current total capacity of all power plants 
in Belarus is approx. 8300 MW). The extra capacity will also offer more room for manoeuvre 
in planning the modernisations of existing plants, many of which are obsolete and ineffective. 
The Belarusian government also hopes that part of the electricity generated by the new 
power plant will be exported to neighbouring countries, including Poland. Energoconnect, 
the Russian-Belarusian joint venture mentioned above, was established in order to deal with 
the export of Belarusian electricity and the re-export of Russian electricity via cross-border 
interconnections. From Minsk’s point of view, the modernisation and expansion of the intercon-
nection with Poland between Ros and Narew is a priority project in this respect. Several years 
ago, the Belarusian leadership struck a deal with Polish businessman Jan Kulczyk to carry out 
this investment. Kulczyk, however, withdrew in early 2011 (while also scrapping his plans to 
build a coal-fired power plant in the Hrodna Province). In view of Kulczyk’s withdrawal and the 
awful condition Belarus-EU relations are in as well as the bilateral relations between Warsaw 
and Minsk, the implementation of the project does not seem feasible at this stage. 
The interests of Russia
Russia’s strategic objective vis-à-vis Belarus in the domain of nuclear energy is primarily to 
block the implementation of any nuclear power plant projects by third parties (Western or 
Asian companies) which could potentially reduce Belarus’s energy dependence on Russia. 
Beyond its main task of supplying 
the domestic electro-energy market, 
the nuclear power plant in Astravyets 
will also be geared towards the export 
of the surplus power it generates 
to EU countries, including Poland.
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Other strategic objectives include maintaining and, if possible, extending Belarus’s reliance 
on Russia in the energy sphere; establishing Russian control over Belarus’s emerging nuclear 
sector and the country’s electricity grids, as well as controls over electricity exports from 
Belarus (in order to create sources of revenue for Russian companies but also to acquire 
an instrument to influence Belarus politically). 
Those objectives with regard to Belarus are part of Russia’s wider strategy for the nuclear 
sectors in the CIS area and Central Europe. In the CIS area, Russia’s strategic objective is to 
consolidate, under Russian control, the nuclear sectors of those countries that already have 
them (Ukraine and Kazakhstan) or that may develop them (Belarus). 
In Central Europe, Russia’s strategic objective is to keep and, if possible, increase its do-
minant position in the nuclear sectors, including through the construction of nuclear power 
plants and the provision of nuclear fuel. Expansion into the domain of exports of electricity 
generated in nuclear power plants in Russia and those built by Russia abroad is a relatively 
new objective in the region. In this context, Russia’s decision to build nuclear power plants 
in Belarus and in the Kaliningrad Oblast appears to be designed to obstruct Lithuania’s com-
petitive project, the nuclear power plant in Visaginas. 
Future prospects
Construction of the nuclear power plant will further increase Belarus’s already significant 
energy dependence on Russia. The agreements concluded to date suggest that the Rus-
sian side has in fact acquired direct control of the export of electricity from Belarus and 
indirect control of the operation of the entire electricity system of Belarus. Moreover, since 
the project is to be financed solely from Russian loans, it will considerably increase Belarus’s 
public debt (which currently already exceeds 20% of GDP, while total foreign debt amounts 
to as much as 80% of GDP). This will strengthen Russia’s control of Belarus, including 
in the political sphere.
The launch of a nuclear power plant will benefit the Belarusian economy. It will ultimately 
reduce the country’s unprecedentedly high share of gas in electricity generation, which sho-
uld drive down the operating costs of Belarus’s energy-intensive industry. The investment 
will also have a positive impact on the environment.
From Russia’s point of view, the implementation of a nuclear power plant project in Astra-
vyets is technically and financially feasible at this stage, and is desirable in view of the 
objectives of Russia’s energy policy mentioned above. The fact that the plant will be loca-
ted close to the Lithuanian border, along with its high capacity – which exceeds Belarus’s 
projected needs – suggest that the investment will be export-oriented. However, the speed 
of construction work and the scale of the project will depend on the status and scope of 
the implementation of the nuclear power plant in Visaginas, Lithuania (the two projects are 
in part competitive) and, more broadly, on the evolution of the energy market in the region 
(electricity supply and demand), the current shape of Russian-Belarusian relations (where 
potential for conflict still exists) and the economic situation in Russia.
